REVIEWS by unknown
REVIEWS
THERE WILL BE No Thm: Tim REVOLUTION IN STRATEGY. By William
Liscum Borden. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1946. Pp. 225. $2.50.
Tins is a book of prophecy, clear-eyed, uncompromising, daring. It out-
does the scientists in boldness of prediction. While they have gloomily
shown that an atomic armaments race will lead to the destruction of civiliza-
tion, Mr. Borden proposes methods for enabling us to survive one. He
thereby raises two questions in answering one: a) will his methods work?
b) will life be worth living under the circumstances attending survival?
Convinced that social and political institutions will remain essentially
unchanged under the impact of recent events, and assuming that predictions
of the dire potentialities of the atom and the rocket, emanating so profusely
from scientific quarters, are to be taken literally, the author presents a con-
jecture as to the nature of coming wars and surveys our chances of victory.
Hope, he thinks, lies solely in being prepared at all times. We must possess
more atomic bombs, more rocket projection ramps than other nations, but
these are obvious and elementary requirements. More important is to have
them properly dispersed throughout our continents and our oceans, and to
have them continually manned. Cities and industries, we are told, may have
been made obsolete by the atomic bomb, but navies will still be needed.
Conscription for military service, while of little practical significance in
itself, is nevertheless advantageous in promoting a psychology of prepared-
ness. Espionage must be deprived of all moral stigma, must be taught and
recognized as an honorable weapon, and must be practiced on a global scale.
Clearly, the acceptance of such singleminded and forthright extrapola-
tions upon the recent past by the reader is unlikely unless he can be assured
of a chance of weathering disaster when it comes. And here he is assured by
Mr. Borden that prospects are not wholly black. For he regards the atomic
bomb primarily as a tactical, not a strategic weapon. An enemy, he feels,
will not waste his bombs on centers of population but will distribute them
over chosen targets from which reprisal might issue. The book musters con-
siderable dialectic effort in delivering this conviction, sometimes as though
the author were aware of its logical precariousness. Here is indeed a major
defect of reasoning. For if the pronouncements of scientists are to be believed
without reservation, as everywhere else in the book, why fall to heed their
warning that a large number of bombs, dropped anywhere on our Continent,
may make life impossible upon it because of radioactive contamination of
the atmosphere?
The book bases its impressive discourse on a vast store of factual informa-
tion, and its literary qualities speak highly of the author's promise. There
is no musty sentimentalism to retard or deflect the course of argumentation.
Frequently the discussion is so unorthodox as to be fascinating, and at times
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one encounters truly revolutionary suggestions. But the reader will dis-
cover its excellence for himself; hence I beg leave to speak of other matters
which must not remain unmentioned in the face of so grave an issue.
It may seem ungracious and pedantic to mention minor infelicities in the
vast theme of this book. But if the errors, however trifling, are predomi-
nantly similar, their occurrence might be telling. The point is that Mr.
Borden's reading, and certainly his understanding, in basic science is not as
wide as it is in political science and military strategy. His technical termi-
nology in matters of chemistry and physics is often faulty ("speed is derived
from momentum"; velocities are usually measured in "knots per hour";
temperatures in "degrees of heat"; "one part of uranium occurs in 140 parts
of the ore"; oxygen is thefuel of rockets!) and he labors under rather serious
misapprehensions about nuclear physics. These are manifest in his recurrent
allusions to the potency of cosmic rays with which we might some day
shower our enemies. Somehow he thinks that the ionosphere protects us
from the impact of these rays, and removal of the ionosphere would spell
disaster to an enemy country. Of all known atoms, he holds that deuterium
might possibly be a substitute for fissionable uranium, a most unfortunate
choice from the point of view of nuclear masses. Less trivial is the uncritical
manner in which Mr. Borden accepts the journalists' verdict on the Bikini
tests: they have shown, he feels, that naval vessels are relatively immune to
atomic blasts. Rumor has it that the waters around Bikini and the test
vessels are still unsafe for navigation!
Such errors are not too numerous, and as errors they are to be excused.
But they are symptomatic of an attitude which is dangerous unless recog-
nized, an attitude which regards political history as the sole criterion for the
possibilities of future achievements of our race. History, in this reviewer's
opinion, guides us safely in avoiding a repetition of past errors, but fails to
encompass the vast unformed potentialities inherent in mankind. While
ready to overlook factual slips, the reader of Borden's book cannot accept
the monstrous consequences of an inquiry reared upon an analytic method
which has never proved itself above suspicion, the method by which history
arrogates to itself the right and the power of prediction. In a sense, Mr.
Borden's book epitomizes the enormous cultural conflict of our time, Nat-
ural science has become creative. When its practitioners said: let there be an
atomic bomb, their fiat came true despite history's ignorance of atomic
bombs. In the opposing camp the student of the social sciences, his face
turned toward the past, pontificates over the depravity of human nature
which, because there always have been wars, insures us that there always
will be. Mr. Borden is a champion of this group. I do not quarrel with his
hypothetical reasoning, but I utterly disagree with his premise.
The premise, as stated before, is that there will be no change in our politi-
cal institutions, in particular that nations will never yield their sovereignties
in an effort to prevent wars. A chapter entitled "The Certainty of War
Amidst Anarchy," inserted near the book's beginning, is designed to prove
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this eternal verity. It abounds with statements like the following: "Among
Christian nations alone the possibility that what has failed to occur in tw:o
thousand years will somehow occur in the next two or three decades seems
negligible." By the same token the chance that atomic energy should be
released in 1944 seemed negligible in 1943. Science, too, has had a period in
which inertia with respect to innovations was very great, in which truly
creative acts appeared impossible; but it succeeded in taking the impor-
tant step from the bondage of tradition to productive freedom. Mr. Borden's
claim that "struggle is as basic an aspect of human life as cooperation"
seems as archaic as Aristotle's belief that a stone falls, and fire rises, because
each tends toward its natural place.
Mr. Borden's belief in the failure of nations to come to terms may be cor-
rect; my criticism of his premise may be invalidated by an atomic catastro-
phe. In that event, however, I doubt whether he will long enjoy his knowl-
edge of having been right.
HENRaY MARGENAUf
THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTERESTS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTS. By
Herman G. James. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1946. Pp. 90.
Mimeographed.
THOSE. who are led by the ambitious title of this booklet to expect a dis-
cussion of various methods by which the public may better obtain its
money's worth in its business dealings are doomed to disappointment.
Except for two pages devoted to dismissing the whole subject of direct per-
formance versus performance by contract with the statement that there is
much to be said on both sides, it deals only with the problem of how to draft
statutes which will reduce opportunities for graft and collusion in the pur-
chase and sale transactions of public bodies.
Starting with the tacit assumption that the general character of our public
servants is such that maximum protection against their dishonesty is of
paramount importance, the author next assumes that the most rigid possible
purchasing procedure in the traditional sealed competitive bidding pattern
is the best way to accomplish this result. He therefore sees no need to do
more than to examine and catalogue the various statutory controls now in
scattered use throughout the country, and to submit, in conclusion, a
"model" statute which combines all of these controls-plus a few additions
and refinements of his own devising-under one heading.
Admittedly graft and favoritism in the purchase of supplies has long
troubled all business organizations, both public and private. Purchasing
t Professor of Physics, Yale University; author of FOUNDATIONS OF Pmrsics (1936)and
MATHEMATICS OF PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY (1943).
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agents are inevitably subjected to temptations by over-zealous salesmen.
And since the general public is too little informed, too apathetic, or too dis-
organized to do the self-initiated checking which profit interested ownership
provides in all but the largest of corporations, it may perhaps be conceded that
public purchasing systems require more formal safeguards against graft and
collusion than private organizations have felt to be necessary. The real
question, therefore, is not whether controls are desirable, but what types of
controls are most effective and at what point does the law of diminishing
returns make further restriction in the interests of graft prevention more
costly than it is worth.
Unfortunately the author precludes any real examination of these basic
issues by his lawyerlike failure to question the validity of his major premises.
Even the fact that during the past six years the bulk of federal purchases
for the war effort were made by negotiation rather than by the competitive
bidding method failed to create in Mr. James any scepticism whatever as to
the value of traditional public purchasing methods. Nor can his complete dis-
regard of this recent experience with negotiated contracts be justified on
the basis that these were emergency purchases in "unusual" times. Every
peace-time sellers' market confronts purchasing bodies with sufficiently sim-
ilar conditions and problems to warrant at least some investigation of the
results of this procedure.
The real function of any purchasing system is to obtain for the purchaser
-be it private industry or public body-the best value for the money ex-
pended. Too much concern with hampering dishonest officials has blinded
the author-as it has many legislators-to the fact that a complicated
competitive bidding system does not necessarily insure this net result. Fre-
quently, in fact, it may have the opposite effect. The mass of red tape en-
tangling some public purchasing systems is so formidable that it often either
completely discourages potential low bidders or causes them to add enough
to their bids to cover the additional cost and nuisance involved in handling a
public contract. Public bodies, in other words, are not "favored" customers
in many areas. The result is that the very foundation of the whole theory of
secret competitive bids-that there is real competition for public business-
crumbles. The "this is more trouble than it's worth" reaction is not condu-
cive to low bids. Yet, except in a very strong buyers' market, too many
businessmen tend to take that attitude when confronted with such require-
ments as affidavits, deposits of 5% of the bid amount, bids in quadruplicate,
complicated specifications, et cetera. Another discouraging factor is the
possibility that even after a contract has been won it may be invalidated
because some technicality in bidding has been overlooked somewhere along
the line. This loss of real competition for public business is a possible serious
hidden cost of cumbersome competitive bidding systems. It should be care-
fully weighed against the savings such systems may effect in reducing graft.
But there is even room for doubt as to the validity of the assumption that
competitive bidding is an important graft deterrent. The author himself
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underscores this doubt by his somewhat grudging admissions that loop-holes
are inevitable in even the most carefully constructed procedures and hence
the only real protection against dishonesty in purchasing departments is the
integrity of officials; that far more opportunities for graft exist at the inspec-
tion than at the contract letting level; and that such existing devices for
policing regulations as suits by taxpayers and losing competitors require
more interested, informed and aggressive individuals than exist. Yet there
is not even a suggestion that there might be value in a study of how effec-
tively the existing comprehensive competitive bidding statutes have elimi-
nated the evils at which they are aimed.
The foregoing are only a few of the questions which can and should be
raised. Sound recommendations for effective public purchasing policy and
procedure can be made only after all such aspects of the problem have been
carefully considered and checked by field work. The author, therefore, by
beginning with what might well never be reached as a conclusion, has mis-
spent much valuable time. Appendix II, for example, contains a digest of
the statutes of each of the forty-eight states dealing with the letting of public
contracts. In view of the difficulty involved in collecting all such statutes
in even one state--scattered as they are under a variety of headings-this
appendix alone represents a painstaking piece of research. It is indeed re-
grettable that the product of so much labor leaves the real questions not
only unanswered but unasked.
ADDISoN A. MUELLERt
GRuNDRIss DES OESTERREICHISCmEN BUERGERLICREN RcRHTs. By Xarl
Wolff (3d Ed.) Vienna: 1946. Pp. 328.
THE remarkable feature of this book, which outlines the Austrian civil
law, is that it contains no apparent trace of the effects of the Nazi occupa-
tion. Yet this is its second edition since the liberation of Austria. It could
as well have been written in 1938 as in 1946. Perhaps the author would like
to forget and have others forget the ordeal of seven years of foreign occupa-
tion. The impact of Nazi rule on Austrian law has been considerable, how-
ever, and should hardly go unnoticed. It is impossible to teach or practice
law in a liberated country without taking into account the deep impression
made by the conquerors upon the former legal system.
Professor Wolff's silence in this textbook is certainly free from suspicious
motives and cannot be imputed to shame or any desire to conceal his own
wartime. record. He is one of three prominent men remaining in Austrian
civil law who are above any suspicion of even mental collaboration. Judge
Kang's amazing brain idled away in the concentration camp of Theresien-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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stadt, Judge Wahle lived underground and thus saved his encyclopaedic
knowledge from destruction, and Professor Wolff was imprisoned and perse-
cuted by the Gestapo. After the liberation, when the thorny restitution
problem required a solution, it was Professor Wolff who suggested that all
increases in wealth during the occupation should be confiscated, saying "It
was either taken away from a Jew 'or given by Hitler. In either case it is
illegal gain."
In the chapters of the book concerning Property and Title the legality of
transfers either during the Nazi rule or while the Allied armies of occupation
are in Austria should be discussed. The Austrian Supreme Court has already
had to decide cases involving transfers of property by members of the oc-
cupying forces. It has held that the sale or gift of a chattel by an individual
member of the Russian army to an Austrian has no legal effect, 1 and that
title cannot be acquired where the property was lost by looting soldiers. 2
Nowhere does Professor Wolff touch on these problems.
When dealing with Matrimonial Law it seems imperative to mention that
the law presently in force is a modified version of the law introduced by the
Germans on August 1, 1938. The religious differences in the former Austrian
law, which the Nazis abolished, have not been revived, but the Nazi features
of racial discrimination and intrusion of the State in family matters-e.g.,
through enforced divorces-have been eliminated. Professor Wolff offers no
opinion as to the validity of divorces enforced by the Nazis or decreed by
them at the request of Aryans' threatened with persecution by the Nazis
because of their marital ties with non-Aryan or anti-Nazi.
The Austrian Code contains a provision for the suspension of statutes of
limitation when there is a complete stoppage of justice.3 It is suggested that
the chapter on Limitations should have answered the question whether the
"justice" provided in Austria during the occupation was anything more than
a cloak for complete lawlessness. If not, should the occupation not have
stopped the running of the statute of limitations?
Many such examples could be quoted. A textbook which bypasses these
problems is incomplete, irrespective of the high scholarly standing of its
author. The influence of seven years of legal concepts directly contrary to
those of civilized states cannot be ignored. Although discussion of these
issues may not be welcome to some students of Austrian law, they must be
faced. Austrian lawyers will have to grapple with the problem of making
the excellent concepts of old Austrian law work in a society deeply impreg-
nated with Nazi doctrines. They cannot participate in the moral revival
of their country, as lawyers, judges and government employees, unless their
eyes are open to the incompatibility of Nazi law and civilized law. Prior to
the occupation Professor Wolff had the courage to lecture on these principles
1. 1 Ob. 104/46 (Austrian Supreme Court. July 12, 1946).
2. 2 Os. 151/46 (Austrian Supreme Court, July 5, 1946).
3. AusTmANx CIvIL CODE § 1496.
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of law to students who were making every effort to become good Nazis. It
certainly seems that he should have the frankness to expound to the present
students of Vienna, who are making every effort to convince the world that
they never were Nazis, the influence of Nazi law upon the Austrian code.
This book also makes an instructive comparison between the European
and American teaching methods. The principles of law are explained in a
thorough and scholarly manner. One who studies the 328 pages of this book
acquires a complete knowledge of Austrian civil law. But the volume con-
tains hardly a single case to which the principles of that law have been ap-
plied. Constantly the student must rack his brain to invent examples of
how the principles would work in reality. The American method is more
realistic, as well as less strenuous upon one's memory.
DR. EuIruio voN HOFMANNSTIALt
THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER. By David Lynch. New York:
The Columbia University Press, 1946. Pp. 423. $6.50.
David Lynch's book is an incisive, melancholy epitaph upon the Tempo-
rary National Economic Committee (TNEC)-the late New Deal's most
important attempt to evaluate the manner in which the technological revolu-
tions of the twentieth century have transmuted our economy. Most of the
hearings and the final report of the TNEC were driven from the headlines by
the beginnings of World War II. In consequence, the Committee's activities
suffered from an undeserved underdose of public attention. So far as I know,
the present book is the first reasonably impartial attempt to summarize and
evaluate TNEC's work.' Despite serious shortcomings, it should not be
missed by citizens concerned with the century-old problem of Wealth Against
the Commonwealth. But its greatest value lies not in the solutions it pre-
sents, but in the questions it asks and, equally, in the unasked questions
which it suggests to the reader.
The flood of recent political memoirs has confirmed the offhand impression
t Member of the Council of the International Law Association, Corresponding Member
of the Argentine Institute of International Law, Adhering Member of the Acad~mie Diplo-
matique Internationale; Seton Hall College.
1. Fact and Fancy in the TN.EC Monograph~s by John Scoville and Noel Sargent,
published under the auspices of the National Association of Manufacturers in 1942, makes
interesting and sometimes valuable criticisms of the statistical assumptions underlying cer-
tain of the TNEC studies. Its criticism, however, is molecular in nature, and the work as a
whole has the tone of an advocate's brief. There are also a series of valuable analyses of
particular TNEC studies in several issues of the American Eonomic Review. See, e.g.,
Stigler, Extent and Basis of Monopoly Studies by the TNEC (1942) 32 Au. EcoN. Rny. SwpP.
1; Book Reviews (1941) 31 id. 839-55.
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that in its early years the New Deal operated by hunch rather than by plan,
that it was the multi-colored offspring of Franklin D. Roosevelt's gift for
improvisation and experiment and not the product of carefully conceived
and coordinated blueprints. Contrary to a popular impression, "the Chief"
was not at first impressed by the challenge to orthodox economics launched
during the thirties. After visiting Roosevelt in 1934, John Maynard Keynes
is reported to have said that he "supposed the Presidentwas more literate,
economically speaking." 2 After the initial shock of the 1937-38 recession
had worn off, however, it became clear that unplanned reform was as un-
successful in maintaining full employment as his predecessor's policy of
planned inactivity. President Roosevelt then sought advice from two ap-
parently contradictory groups of advisers. He was led by Harry Hopkins
and Leon Henderson to accept the Keynes-Alvin Hansen program of planned
deficit financing to offset declines in private investment spending, comple-
mented by legislation to divert income to the poorer groups in the com-
munity through social security and welfare payments, as well as more pro-
gressive taxation. At the same time, and under the influence of Robert
Jackson, the President was preparing to resuscitate the drive against "the
gentleman crook, monopoly," here appearing as the father of depression.
In April 1938, after a meeting at Warm Springs attended by both groups
of advisers, the President delivered to Congress his famous "monopoly
message," calling for the creation of a special committee to investigate "the
growing concentration of economic power," stated to be a progenitor of idle
factories and idle men. The Committee established in response to this mes-
sage eventually came under the control of two men-Senator O'Mahoney of
Wyoming and Leon Henderson.
Chairman O'Mahoney was a member of the school of American progres-
sives, chiefly Westerners, who regarded free competition as the nostrum for
all economic evils. Although conducting the hearings with conspicuous fair-
ness, he conceived one of TNEC's main uses to be the publicization of his
bill requiring federal incorporation of large corporations.3 The Senator
found an ally in Thurman Arnold of the Department of Justice to whom
TNEC was, at least in part, a town meeting to advertise and secure larger
appropriations for the Anti-Trust Division.
Leon Henderson, the first Executive Secretary and Research Director of
TNEC, was a man of different mold. He saw little gain in dramatic public
hearings and sought to direct the Committee into" careful investigation of the
operations of our economy, carried out by scholars, in the manner of a
British Royal Commission.
In consequence, the Committee from its inception was plagued by divided
2. PERKINS, THE RoosEvELT I KNEw (1946) 225-6.
3. See chapter 2 for discussion of events leading to the creation of the TNEC and also
for an evaluation of the motives of the leading members of the Committee. Chapter 3 con-




control. But an acceptable pattern of compromise was soon found. For the
most part, TNEC public hearings were the progeny of O'Mahoney and
Thurman Arnold. 4 A parade of witnesses from Government and industry
testified as to the variegated forms assumed in the masquerade of monopoly.
Simultaneously, but unfortunately in dimmer spotlight, a group of econo-
mists was employed to conduct surveys of less sensational and more difficult
problems: the savings-investment dilemma, the effects of our tax structure,
the consequences of a high tariff policy. The research staff also probed
deeply into aspects of the "monopoly problem," scarcely touched upon at
the public hearings.
Lynch's book is limited in coverage to the hearings of the Committee and
its final report. In one sense, the limitation scarcely seems unreasonable,
since the author had to cope with a "three-foot shelf containing 37 volumes
(of hearings) and 17,000 pages." In another sense, it is the author's self-
limiting approach which is responsible for the elegiac and futilitarian tone
of his book. As Lynch himself points out, there is "relatively little that is
new" in the hearings. "The recurring impression which the reader receives
is, 'Why, this is not new; this is merely a labored and unnecessary catalog of
the obvious.'" 5
Essentially, the new and constructive work of TNEC was done by the
research staff. Such monographs as Walton Hamilton's analysis of the
operations and limitations of the Anti-Trust Division; the FTC report on
the relative efficiency of large, middle-sized and small businesses; and the
path-breaking inquests by Nelson and Keim into the consequences of in-
flexible, business-fixed prices, and by Dimock and Hyde into the bureauc-
racy of large corporations are required reading for those interested in evolv-
ing a rational policy for control of business. Who Pays the Taxes? by Colim
and Tarasov analyzed with unprecedented care the over-all impact of our
tax structure, revealing that it operates regressively, so as to take away the
largest percentage of income from those in the lower income brackets.
These are only a few sheaves from a rich harvest.0 Thus in failing to include
4. The first day's hearings, however, consisted of a brilliant summary of the structure
of the American economy, presented by Willard Thorp and Committee members Leon
Henderson and Isador Lubin. See Hearings Before the Temporary National Economic Corn-
mittee .Pursuant to Pub. Res. 113 (75th; Cong.), 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) Pt. 1; id. 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) Pt. 9; id. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) Pt. 30.
5. Pp.356,173.
6. See the following TNEC reports: HAMmTON, TNEC REP., A.NTi-TRUsT L AcTioN,
Monograph 16 (1940); F.T.C., TNEC REP., REL.ATIVE EFFICIENCY OF LARGE, MEDItP-
SIZED AND SmALL BusINEss, Monograph 13 (1941); NELSON AND KEIu, TNEC REP., Prxc
BEHAVIOR AND BusINEss POLICIES, Monograph 1 (1940); DimocK AND HYDn, TNEC REP.,
BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION, Monograph 11 (1940);
COLm AND TARASOV, TNEC REp., WHO PAYS TE TAXzs? Monograph 3 (1940); WILcox,
TNEC REP., COmPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, Monograph 21 (1940);
KEPs, TNEC REP., MEASUREMENT OF THE SOCLu. PERFORmANCxE OF BusLTEss, Mono-
graph 7 (1941).
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the monographs in the scope of his book, Lynch has committed an error of
orission, the more grievous because many of his readers will not be aware
of it.
I do not mean to pass off too lightly the importance of the TNEC hear-
ings. To start with immediate results, the TNEC gave aid and comfort to
the Anti-Trust Division, newly entrusted to the imaginative Thurman
Arnold, in the first serious attempt ever made to enforce the Sherman Act.7
It helped secure minor, but desirable reforms in patent laws. It forced down
a half score of prices in less competitive industries. Moreover, the Com-
mittee hearings cut a wide swath through the fields of American business,
illuminating many trade practices. Complete with names, dates and figures
they furnished evidence of restraints of competition at work in innumerable
industries-through the media of the holding company, price leadership,
patent pools and trade associations. There were other brief but illuminating
forays into the plight of consumers in a world of high-powered hucksters,
the inequality of income distribution, the increasing volume of long-con-
tinued technological unemployment.
To the economically uninitiated, still living in the textbook world of
twenty years ago, the Committee hearings furnished a useful introduction
to the realities of modern business life. For the more worldly, they docu-
mented what previously was guessed at or incompletely known. True, much
of the material came from other government reports: but it was surely de-
sirable to concentrate such information, pigeon-holed after a score of obscure
investigations. Moreover, at points" the TNEC hearings explored relatively
unknown terrain. One of the best examples was the investigation of life
insurance companies and practices-which highlighted the extreme costs of
industrial insurance, the expense and inadequacy of regulation by 48 state
commissions, and the key position which the insurance companies have
secured in the capital market because of the huge investment funds at their
command.
The author has condensed 17,000 pages of testimony into a 200-page
section of his book. I know of no other work which provides as quick, ac-
curate, and painless a summary of the operations of big business. Nor does
'Lynch restrict himself to summarization. He carefully points out the in-
consistencies between the high pretensions of the Committee and its limited
7. In the great trust busting campaign of Theodore Roosevelt, the Anti-Trust Divi-
sion had a staff of seven lawyers and four stenographers. In 1933 it had a professional staff
of only 26 persons. The effect was once described in the following language: "Practically
under the Harding, Coolidge and Hoover administrations, industry enjoyed, to all intents
and purposes, a moratorium from the Sherman Act. . . ... Stevenson, Price Control and
Allolment of Business, Address Before the Annual Convention of the Nat. Ass'n of Cost
Accountants, Cleveland, Ohio, June 26, 1934. Even in 1940, the Division had a professional
staff one-quarter of the size of that possessed by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
totaling only 190 lawyers and 17 experts. See Edwards, Can the Antitrust Laws Preserve
Competition? (1940) 30 Aix. EcoN. REv. Surp. 164.
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achievements. It would be amusing, if it were not appalling, to read of the
manner in which Senator O'Mahoney barred an investigation into the effect
of our tariff policy and of expensive advertising campaigns in robbing the
consumers' pocketbook3 In his concluding chapter, frankly based in part
upon the minority report of Henderson and Lubin, the author points out
the "element of escapism" entailed "in the almost exclusively monopoly
approach" of TNEC. "There is a tacit assumption running through both
the hearings and the final report that the depression was in large part the
fruit of economic concentration and monopoly. Nowhere, however, was a
case developed to show this causal relationship." 9
In his original "monopoly message," President Roosevelt had at least
intimated that the concentration of economic power and the prevalence of
sticky price and other business policies impeding full employment did not
comprise a single problem susceptible to simple or even unified government
action. In Lynch's pages, the unfortunate demise of the President's acute
insight is clearly revealed.
As climactic futility, the Committee seems to have treated the persistence
of large scale unemployment as being solely the result of monopoly. One
can only echo the Cassandrish words with which Charles Beard had greeted
the origin of TNEC: "If all we can do is to snap at the heels of business,
while the economic machine runs at 50% of efficiency, then we might as well
give it up and go whistling, not in the wind, but in the graveyards." 10
I have not intended in the preceding paragraphs to criticize anti-trust
activities as such. But it seems high time that an uncritical clamor against
"monopolies" was replaced by an attempt to devise standards of business
performance and to design new tools for securing such performance. Certain
dominant considerations are apparent.
First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between the problem of bigness
and the problem of business arteriosclerosis. The problem of bigness poses
the question of whether a democratic society can survive in the face of con-
centrated wealth. Obviously, this is a question of political and social, rather
than economic values. The problem of business arteriosclerosis is an eco-
nomic quagmire, created by certain types of uncompetitive practices which
make it difficult for our economy to operate efficiently and at high levels of
productivity. The tendency toward bigness and the tendency toward
rigidity are both highly objectionable, but they are different diseases, re-
quiring separate treatments. There are situations where the big enterprise,
such as the chain store, is more efficient than its small competitor and brings
the consumer lower prices. Therefore, some legislation allegedly adopted in
an attempt to protect the small retailer against his bigger competitor, such
8. Pp. 361-2; cf. 84 CONG. REc. 3496 App. (1939).
9. P. 365.
10. Beard, The Anti-Trust Racket (1938) 116 NEw REPUBLIC 182; see al-o MacDonald,
The Monopoly Committee (1939) 8 Tnr Am. SCROLAR 303.
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as anti-chain store taxes, the Miller-Tydings Act, the state unfair competi-
tion laws, may act as a government bulwark for small scale inefficiency and
local monopolies.
In the second place, it seems time that statesmen and even professors of
economics discarded the Rousseauean dream that a "return to free competi-
tion" would solve all our economic ills. The control of Big Business has very
little to do with the problem of maintaining full employment. Monopoly is
neither a new condition, nor one that is of demonstrably increasing impor-
tance." The bald fact is that sticky prices were as common in 1890 and
perhaps 1820 as they are today.' 2 The Standard Oil Company was a more
successful ogre in the heyday of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. than in that of
John D. Rockefeller, III. In the face of persistent concentration of owner-
ship and continued monopolistic practices, it is a verifiable fact that pro-
duction and income increased steadily in the United States in the period
1870-1930.'" As a matter of simple logic I think this leads to the conclusion
that "monopoly" has little to do with business stagnation. The analyses of
Keynes, Hansen, Beveridge, and their disciples lead to the same conclusion,
particularly in indicating that monopolistic practices cannot be charged
with any great responsibility for the severity of the post-1929 slump. 14
Clearly, certain monopolistic practices do make maintenance of full em-
ployment difficult. The Keynes-Hansen school (although not President
Roosevelt) has probably, in its turn, made a one-sided analysis in failing
to give this question appropriate attention. But the point is that if we con-
11. Although all existing markets are, correctly speaking, characterized as being in a
state of "monopolistic competition," businessmen and regulators have realistically con-
tinued to describe some as "monopolistic" and others as "competitive." From the buyer's
point of view, a state of practical competition exists when there are available alternative
sources of supply, not subject to common control or influence in determining price or other
basic policy, and where the industry is capable of being entered by new competitors. This,
of course, is a short summary of a complex problem. For more complete discussion, see
Edwards, supra note 7; Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition (1940) 30 Am. Ec.
REv. 241; Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 34.
In Edwards' words: "In their reaction from the highly artificial antithesis between pure
competition and pure monopoly, economic theorists have recently been emphasizing the
fact that elements of competition and monopoly appear in all markets; and in their en-
thusiasm for this limited truth they have provided not much theoretical basis for distin-
guishing differences in degree." Edwards supra note 7, at 170.
12. Humphrey, The Nature and Meaning of Rigid Prices, 1890-1933 (1937) 45 J. PoL.
EcoN. 651; Mason, Price Inflexibility (1938) 20 REv. EcoN. STAT. 53; MILLS, ECONOMI
,TENDENCIES IN TEE UNITED STATES (1932) 105 et seg. Recent analysis has shaken the old
assumption that under conditions of perfect competition, the economic system would
allocate resources in such a manner as absolutely to maximize production. See, e.g., Kalm,
Some Notes on Ideal Output (1935) 45 EcoN. J. 1.
13. See the material collected in SCHUIMPETER, CAPITALISI, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(1942) 63-72; National Industrial Conference Board Studies, No. 241, pp. 6-7. (My citation
of Schumpeter for this particular point is not to be interpreted as a general acceptance of the
point of view expressed in his book).
14. See, e.g., HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY AND BusiNEss CYCLES (1941) 313-41.
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tinue firing blunderbusses at "monopoly" in general, we may miss the oppor-
tunity to touch off T.N.T. under those particular practices which impede
attainment of full employment. In the construction industry, for example, a
whole series of managerial and labor practices combine to keep many of us
ill-housed, and to clog desirable investment outlets.15 In innumerable other
fields, patent pools and other devices restricting introduction of technological
improvements or the entrance of new firms into the industry, directly and
obviously promote stagnation.
Thirdly, adventurous statesmanship should surely be able to devise a
quicker and more effective mode for curbing socially dangerous business
practices than trial in the district court. In too many instances such pro-
ceedings have ceased "to be cases and become for all practical purposes
careers for those involved." 16 Some of the available alternatives deserve
mention. When the technology of an industry, or the capital investment of
the existing firm or firms, make something akin to complete monopoly in-
eradicable, government purchase and operation of the existing private units
may be an effective way out. 7 In other fields, the construction of govern-
ment yardstick plants may be a useful means to bring prices down as effi-
ciency mounts. The record of TVA in leading the power industry to higher
sales and profits through lower rates suggests emulation in other fields.' 8
Where restrictive practices are raised on the fulcrum of patents, a require-
ment of compulsory licensing at reasonable prices may be the easiest way to
open the door for new firms.'9
It is to be hoped that a belated beginning of the debate which should have
been generated by TNEC will force such questions as these into the arena of
15. One of the great achievements of the Anti-Trust Division under Thurman Arnold
was to investigate and prosecute simultaneously restraints of trade running throughout the
construction industry. Lack of funds unfortunately precluded similar investigations and
prosecutions in other industries.
16. Cahill, Recent Trends in the Anti-Trust Laws (1946) 1 THn REconn op TaE Ass'N
oF Tm BAP OF =E Crry OF N. Y. 201,204.
17. The alternative possibility of regulation by the techniques applied in the public
utility industry would, it is believed, be both cumbersome and ineffective. See testimony of
Jerome Frank, Hearings Before te Temporary National Economic Conmittee Pursuant to
-Pub. Res. 113 (75t1h Cong.), 76th Cong., IstSess. (1939) Pt. 5, pp. 1954-9, 1975.
18. A similar record resulted from the price policies adopted during the 19203 by Henry
Ford and Harvey Firestone, in the automobile and tire industries, respectively.
19. A trend in this direction has been apparent in several recent decisions in anti-
trust cases. See United States v. Pullman Company, S0 F. Supp. 123 (E. D. Pa. 1943);
Hartford Empire Company v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945), 324 U. S. 570 (1945);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945). See Consent Decree, United States v.
General Electric Co. et at., Civil Action Nos. 1364, 2590 (D. N. J., March 7,1946), Pts. VI,
XIII; Consent Decree, United States v. Bendix Aviation Corp., Civil Action No. 2531
(D. N. J., Feb. 13, 1946), Pt. VII (B); Consent Decree, United States v. Diamond Match
Co., Civil Action No. 25-397 (S. D. N. Y., April 9, 1946), Pt. IX; Consent Decree, United
States v. Western Precipitation Corp., Civil Action No. 4677-C (S. D. Cal., April 11, 1946),
Pt. V. For the list of these citations I am indebted to Cahill, supra note 16, at 223 n. 42.
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both public and scholarly discussion. From such process there will surely
emerge a sharper analysis of economic problems, and this in turn should help
our statesmen to develop less blunted programs of action.2"
ASHER LANS t
20. Analysis of relationship between cyclical business fluctuations and monopolistic
practices is still in an elementary stage. Some of the best discussions, all fragmentary in
nature, are Hildebrand, Monopolization and the Decline of Investment Opportunity (1943) 33
Am. EcoN. REv. 591-601; Abramovitz, Savings and Investment; Profits vs. Prosperity? (1942)
32 Am. EcoN. Rnv. Supr. 78; HABERLER, PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION (3d ed. 1942)
c. 13; Hansen loc. cit. supra note 14.
t Member of the New York Bar; former lecturer in Economics at Hunter College and
Brooklyn College.
